EU Clearinghouse on NPP OEF Summary Report on Fuel Related Events by MARTIN RAMOS MANUEL
  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
EUR 24579 EN - 2010  
EU Clearinghouse on NPP OEF
Summary Report on Fuel Related Events 
 
Manuel Martín Ramos  
 
The mission of the JRC-IE is to provide support to Community policies related to both nuclear 
and non-nuclear energy in order to ensure sustainable, secure and efficient energy production, 
distribution and use. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
European Commission 
Joint Research Centre 
Institute for Energy 
 
Contact information 
Address: Postbus 2, 1755 ZG Petten, the Netherlands 
E-mail: Manuel.MARTIN-RAMOS@ec.europa.eu 
Tel.: +31-224-565035 
Fax: +31-224-565637 
 
http://ie.jrc.ec.europa.eu/ 
http://www.jrc.ec.europa.eu/ 
 
Legal Notice 
Neither the European Commission nor any person acting on behalf of the Commission is 
responsible for the use which might be made of this publication. 
 
Europe Direct is a service to help you find answers 
to your questions about the European Union 
 
Freephone number (*): 
00 800 6 7 8 9 10 11 
 
(*) Certain mobile telephone operators do not allow access to 00 800 numbers or these calls may be billed. 
 
A great deal of additional information on the European Union is available on the Internet. 
It can be accessed through the Europa server http://europa.eu/ 
 
JRC 60219 
 
EUR 24579 EN 
ISBN 978-92-79-17529-9 
ISSN 1018-5593 
doi:10.2790/2436 
 
Luxembourg: Publications Office of the European Union 
 
© European Union, 2010 
 
Reproduction is authorised provided the source is acknowledged 
 
Printed in Luxembourg 
 
INTRODUCTION 
 
Fuel performance and reliability, especially fuel integrity, is one of the major aspects for the 
safe operation of nuclear power plants. Over the years, a very significant effort has been put 
into analysing and understanding the causes of the fuel failures, and important strategies in 
design, engineering, manufacture, inspection, operation and management have been 
developed to try to eradicate them. The results of this effort are reflected in improvements 
relating to the use of new materials, a more robust design, new fabrication methods, more 
efficient inspections of the newly built fuel assemblies, quality assurance and better 
operational strategies. The extension of fuel burnup, power increases and more aggressive 
operating conditions have also driven the search for better performing fuels, by designing 
better cladding, investigating pellet-cladding interaction and other fuel failure mechanisms 
and strategies. 
 
However, despite these efforts and improvements, fuel failure events during operation, fuel 
handling, and fuel storage continue to occur. Based on the analysis of 169 fuel related events 
reported in nuclear power plants worldwide, this summary report brings together the main 
insights, recommendations and conclusions to contribute to reduce the number of fuel failure 
events.  
 
MAIN INSIGHTS 
 
In-core fuel failures. 
 
The following in-core fuel failure mechanisms were identified: 
 
- Debris fretting 
- Grid to rod fretting 
- Baffle jetting 
- Pellet Cladding Interaction 
- Hydriding 
- Corrosion 
- Manufacturing defects 
- Insufficient cooling 
- Dimensional changes during operation (rod growth caused by irradiation, fuel/fuel 
channel bow/twist, etc) 
- Power oscillation/instabilities 
- Calculation/simulation/calibration/instrument error. 
 
The main causes of most in-core fuel failures are related to a deficient design of the fuel 
assemblies or its components, or to the deficient design of non-routine interventions such as 
fuel cleaning or reactor coolant system decontamination. Human performance (i.e. operation 
errors, water chemistry errors, or selection of erroneous models or parameters) is the 
predominant cause of power oscillations and calculation error events. 
 
Short term remedial actions taken for in-core accidents are aimed at continuing operation 
until a more definitive solution is implemented, and usually consist in the recovery of the 
affected fuel assembly, its repair or substitution, the application of temporary measures 
(design patches, operational restrictions), and the increase in the surveillance of the fuel by 
radiological monitoring of the reactor coolant while in operation, or during outages.  
 
Long term remedial actions are mainly concentrated on design modifications in fuel 
assemblies and other hardware, and improvements in operational practices.   
 
Remedial actions taken have shown themselves to be effective in reducing the frequency of 
in-core fuel failure modes. Phenomena such as manufacturing defects, dimensional changes 
and baffle jetting have not been reported in the last 15 years, and only events caused by 
debris fretting, corrosion, insufficient cooling and calculation errors have been reported in the 
last 5 years. Thus, specific measures to cope with these failure modes still need to be further 
enhanced. 
 
Fuel handling events 
 
Refuelling of nuclear power plants is a well established and reliable routine operation which, 
depending on the reactor type, is done on power or during cold shutdown. On-power 
refuelling requires complex automatic fuelling machines, whereas off-power refuelling is a 
semi-automatic operation requiring more direct human intervention. The main causes of fuel 
failure events are human error and equipment failures. Human errors are the most frequent 
cause of fuel handling events in reactor types with refuelling during cold shutdown.  Fuelling 
machine or tools failures are more frequent in reactor types with automatic on-power 
refuelling. 
 
Human errors include errors in rigging and positioning the fuel assembly, operation of the 
refuelling tools, inadequate planning, inadequate control and monitoring, inadequate 
implementation of procedures, insufficient attention to or compliance with the administrative 
procedures to avoid core loading errors. Fuel machine or tools failures include the failure of 
components (hooks, grapples, motors, fuel structure), insufficient resistance and durability of 
some fuel handling equipment, deficient design (grid snagging, bulges), and insufficient 
monitoring and control systems (weight cells, lighting, TV cameras, interlocks).  
 
Remedial actions consist in the recovery, repair or disposal of the affected fuel bundle, the 
repair or design modification of the refuelling machines (by implementing supplemental aids 
to the operators), additional training, improved procedures, better surveillance and more 
efficient organization.   
 
Storage events. 
 
Regardless of the final fuel management strategy selected, after the fuel is burned in the 
reactor core, it is taken to a wet storage facility (spent fuel pool) designed to comply with the 
spent fuel safety criteria. By comparison with the initial designs, spent fuel pools have had to 
adapt to the growing need for storage capacity of fuel with different characteristics from those 
originally planned. 
 
The following categories of events during storage have been identified: 
 
- Events in which the margin to criticality had been reduced. 
- Events with loss of cooling 
- Events with actual or potential fuel integrity concerns 
- Events with radiological impacts. 
 
The main causes of these events are human error and, to a lesser extent, design 
deficiencies. Some of these deficiencies originated in the initial design of the spent fuel pool, 
but sometimes the design deficiencies result from a change in the characteristics of the fuel 
to be stored (i.e. higher enrichment and burnup fuel, reracking for a more compact storage 
configuration, higher thermal power). 
 
Events with a reduction in the margin to criticality and events with fuel integrity concerns are 
scarce, and they are specifically caused by an incorrect concentration of boron, incidents with 
neutron absorbers in structures, errors in the calculation of the shutdown margin, or failure in 
the control and monitoring of the spent fuel pool water chemistry. Restoring the boron 
concentration, repairing the neutron absorber in the structures, and correcting the 
calculations is sufficient to recover the criticality margin.   
 
Events with loss of cooling (including falls in the level of the spent fuel pool water) are more 
frequent, and are caused by the characteristics of the spent fuel pool cooling system 
(interconnections and manual operation), by leakages in the liner, and the lack of monitoring 
systems, possibly leading to delay in detecting the problem.  However, these events are 
slow, and there is usually enough time to regularize the cooling function.  
 
Events with radiological impact are frequent, due to the numerous activities and 
circumstances that could lead to radiological exposure of the workers. The main cause of 
these events is the lack of careful planning of activities in the spent fuel pool building and lack 
of analysis to identify all possible sources of radiological exposure.   
 
 MAIN FINDINGS 
 
Operating experience in the use of fuel over the years indicates that there is not one 
particular fuel design which stands out in relation to the others. Despite the great efforts put 
into improving the design and manufacture of the fuel assemblies, which has allowed a better 
performance and higher operational margins, more demanding operating conditions for the 
fuel have raised concerns about fuel performance. Examples of such conditions are: 
 
– higher enrichment  
– higher burnup 
– operation of a mixed core with assemblies of different designs,  
– lead fuel assemblies testing.   
– core power management strategies 
– fuel unloading strategies to achieve shorter outages. 
– singular practices: system decontamination and fuel cleaning. 
 
The result of these counteracting trends 
is that in-core fuel performance has 
improved significantly, but there are still 
some fuel failure causes which need to 
be addressed, such as debris and grid 
to rod fretting (20 % of in-core events 
reported in the last 15 years), 
insufficient cooling (18 %), corrosion (20 
%), and calculation errors (10 %).  
 
Non-routine practices, such as systems 
decontamination or fuel assembly 
cleaning, have also highlighted the need 
for a thorough assessment in order to 
take account of unforeseen 
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consequences, in particular fuel cooling and the behaviour of the fuel materials with regard to 
corrosion and crud buildup after using decontamination and cleaning chemicals. 
 
Fuel handling events involve a very specific kind of fuel failure. A large number of rapid 
uncomplicated operations have to be carried out repetitively.  Depending on the plant design, 
the operations are mainly automatic (such as the automatic refuelling of on-power refuelling 
systems), or semi-automatic, where an operator closely monitors and handles the refuelling 
tools himself. Due to the nature of the operations, automatic systems are more prone to non 
human errors, whereas manual or semi-automatic systems are more prone to human errors. 
Nevertheless, due to the particularities of 
the automatic systems, human 
intervention is usually also very intense, 
including the programming of the 
machine. As a result events caused by 
human errors are also significant, and add 
to the design, documentary and 
operational potential deficiencies of the 
automatic systems. Overall, 24 % of the 
events analysed involved fuel drops, 26 % 
involved fuel handling problems in core 
(misposition, incorrect insertion), and 36 
% involved handling problems ex-core 
(mainly refuelling machine malfunctions). 
 
Storage events can be caused by a reduction of the shutdown margin, the loss of the fuel 
bundle integrity, and the loss of the spent fuel pool cooling. Another group of events with 
radiological impact is also included in this analysis, even though most of the events actually 
have nothing to do with fuel. Operator errors while operating the spent fuel pool systems or 
other personnel errors while conducting interventions in the spent fuel pool systems are 
among the main causes of the selected events. Design and operation are also significant 
causes, particularly since the conditions 
and characteristics of the spent fuel 
currently being discharged from the 
reactor core are more demanding 
(residual heat, full core offload practices) 
than the conditions of the fuel for which 
the spent fuel pool and its auxiliary 
systems were designed. Spent fuel 
storage system Probabilistic Safety 
Assessments (PSA) are used to find the 
weaknesses of the system and to help the 
operator to decide how to monitor them. 
Half of the events analysed consisted in 
loss of cooling, and 34.4 % were events 
with radiological impact. 
 
MAIN RECOMMENDATIONS 
 
FUEL DESIGNERS. 
 
Fuel designers should continue developing fuel designs with improved materials to 
accommodate the current fuel operation conditions pertaining to higher burnup, higher power 
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density, power management, etc. so that phenomena like Pellet Cladding Interaction, 
corrosion and hydriding are no longer a concern. For example, Niobium alloys for the 
cladding or stainless steel for the fastening components reduce the risk of corrosion and 
hydriding. Different characteristics of the fuel pellet (shape, composition or manufacturing 
method) reduce the effect of Pellet Cladding Interaction. 
 
Mechanical design should preclude debris and grid to rod fretting, by providing filtering 
mechanisms to trap debris (debris catchers) before it enters the core, and by reducing the 
cladding wear by improving grid-to-rod contact, using wear resistant cladding, and avoiding 
fuel bundle vibration caused by the coolant flow by adequate hydraulic design and stiffening 
of the fuel structure by inserting additional spacer grids and thickening guide tubes..   
 
Fuel handling should be facilitated by carefully designing the fuel bundle, in particular the 
bottom and top heads, grids and bulges to reduce the risk of snagging, incorrect insertion of 
fuel bundles and fuel drop.   
 
Fuel manufacturers should continue improving their inspection and quality assurance 
practices so as to avoid issuing any fuel bundles with flaws. 
 
OPERATORS 
 
Operators should select an updated fuel design. Up-to-date fuel designs cope with many of 
the fuel failure mechanisms such fretting, Pellet Cladding Interaction, and corrosion induced 
failures.  
 
Operators should pay special attention to improving operation and maintenance practices, in 
particular: 
 
- Adopting foreign material exclusion practices in all aspects of the nuclear power plant 
operation (maintenance, etc), especially preventive measures to avoid dropping 
foreign materials in the primary coolant system, to reduce the impact of debris fretting 
related events. 
 
- Analysis of consequences of singular interventions. Singular interventions, such as 
primary circuit decontamination and fuel cleaning, present the risk of fuel failure if the 
evaluation of the potential consequences is insufficient or incomplete. Careful 
evaluation of the design and the analysis of potential consequences is needed. In 
particular, to avoid  accelerated corrosion and/or crud deposition (and thus a risk of 
clogging the cooling channels and insufficient cooling events) in the fuel bundle after 
primary circuit decontamination, the operator must ensure that all the remainder 
(residues) of the chemical species used are flushed out of the primary circuit., 
because they could cause. Alternative remedial actions, such as passivation of the 
inner system surfaces and reactor coolant chemical monitoring and control, can 
reduce the corrosion and crud buildup. In the case of fuel cleaning, the device must be 
adequately designed (to consider all foreseeable operating conditions) and monitored 
(to quickly identify any abnormal occurrence) in order to avoid the insufficient cooling 
and melting of the fuel. 
 
- Water chemistry control and monitoring aims to reduce the impact of the different 
corrosion phenomena.  However, water chemistry strategies involve adding different 
elements which have competing effects. Succeeding in balancing the water chemistry 
with the correct amount and type of additives is a slow process. Operators should plan 
a step-by-step approach with sufficient time, so that the effect of each change in water 
chemistry can be adequately assessed and tested.    
 
Special attention should be given to human and organisational factors, especially during 
routine or repetitive operations (i.e. refuelling), to avoid human performance presenting a 
significant risk. Careful drafting of procedures and other guidance, training, coordination, 
supervision, revision, adequate staffing, motivation, etc. are all activities that improve 
human performance. 
 
In particular, fuel handling aids are beneficial in reducing the risk of fuel handling events. 
Fuel handling aids include instrumentation, surveillance equipment, interlocks, and design 
modifications to eliminate refuelling machine failures as far as possible. In combination 
with sound procedures and operational documentation, as well as training and rehearsal 
(in the case of unusual operations), fuel handling aids reduce the risk of fuel handling 
events.   
 
Fuel characterisation should be a requirement when spent fuel is to be transferred from 
the spent fuel pool to a dry storage system. The history of each fuel assembly, with 
special reference to its integrity, could shape the spent fuel management strategy. Failed 
fuel stored in the spent fuel pool for many years needs to be characterised and even 
repaired before it is placed in a dry spent fuel storage facility. Fuel integrity needs to be 
assessed in order to evaluate whether the affected fuel assembly can even be handled 
with the normal fuel handling tools. Attention should be also paid to long-term degrading 
phenomena, such as delayed hydrogen-assisted fuel cladding failure. This phenomenon 
can pose a risk of fuel cladding failure during spent fuel management, especially if a dry 
storage system is to be used. 
 
Activities in the spent fuel pool should be carefully planned and analysed, to identify all 
the possible sources of radiation exposure, either inadvertent, or caused by human 
intervention. If necessary, training and rehearsal of the activity should be planned and 
executed.  
 
REGULATORY AUTHORITIES 
 
Regulatory authorities should enhance the sharing of operating experience relating to fuel 
failure events. Being aware of operating experience will make it possible to identify whether 
any of the phenomena described in this report becomes more frequent, or ceases to be a 
concern. Continuous surveillance of the fuel performance could eventually identify new fuel 
failure phenomena caused by the current operating conditions of the new fuel designs. 
Regulatory authorities should enhance the operators to carry out systematic periodic fuel 
inspections of failed and intact fuel assemblies in nuclear power plants, which is considered a 
valuable tool to achieve this objective.   
  
Special attention should be paid to one-off operations or tasks that might have consequences 
for fuel in the following cycles. Means should be used to detect whether all the possible 
consequences of such one-off operations have been correctly evaluated, so as to identify all 
foreseeable conditions that could affect fuel behaviour. 
 
Easy, routine repetitive operations can lead to careless performance. Mechanisms to ensure 
adequate and sufficient supervision and checking should be implemented by the operator 
and enhanced by the regulator. 
 
GOOD PRACTICES 
 
As a complement to the recommendations above, a list of current practices broadly applied in 
nuclear power plants are presented below. These good practices can be considered to be an 
important result of operational experience feedback practices because they originated in 
corrective actions or lessons learned of actual events 
 
Adequate and accurate monitoring are established and maintained to detect and locate a 
possible fuel failure, or potential conditions for fuel failure. The surveillance is useful in 
deciding whether to continue operation or to shut down. The method generally used is 
radiation monitoring of the fuel coolant, with alarm levels adjusted below the technical 
specification limits to account for fuel failure detection. Prompt detection and location of a 
failed rod could allow operational actions to be taken (i.e. power reduction) to limit the 
consequences of the fuel failure.  Other examples include the installation of spent fuel pool 
level instrumentation. 
 
When switching to a new fuel assembly design and operating mixed cores, the operating 
conditions of the core are analysed very carefully. The possible negative impacts of operating 
a mixed core are flow inhomogeneities (potential for flow induced vibration or insufficient 
cooling), and mechanical incompatibility (grid snagging).  Hydraulic testing of new fuel 
designs is usually a necessary precondition, although in some particular cases mixed cores 
have led to higher rates of fuel failure. 
 
Similarly, when switching to longer cycles, careful assessment is done in order to identify all 
possible effects of the operational strategies of longer cycles, with respect to core power 
profiles, reactivity, “spectral shift”, radiation growth, etc.  
 
When changes take place in core operation strategies (higher burnups, longer cycles, more 
aggressive operational strategies), the following operations, among others are performed 
very thoroughly: revaluation of actions currently carried out (i.e. fuel assemblies loaded in 
intermediate positions for fuel shuffling, full core off-loading in refuelling outages, higher 
residual heat load to the spent fuel pool cooling system, etc.).  
 
Regarding strategies in BWR operation, instability is assessed when defining the core power 
- core flow map, as well as careful design and verification of the control rod patterns. Power 
profiles in all likely conditions are carefully taken into account to ensure that peak values are 
covered under the core licence analysis. Protective actions, i.e. not only manual or 
procedural, but also automatic actions, have been implemented. 
 
When performing calculations to define fuel limits, or when using models and computers for 
safety calculations, special attention is paid to the correctness of the model, its 
implementation, the calculation, and its verification. This is done with regard to the model 
itself and its coding, but also with regard to the conditions in which the model is applied. 
These conditions are taken into account in the model, and the model is verified to check that 
the assumptions, simplifications, parameter values, etc are valid under such conditions. 
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Abstract 
Fuel performance and reliability, especially fuel integrity, is one of the important aspects of the safe operation of 
nuclear power plants. The fuel rod cladding surrounding the fuel pellets represents the first barrier to the release 
of radioactive fission products. Fuel integrity must be maintained during normal operation and expected 
transients, and fuel damage must be limited during postulated accidents.   
 
Over the years, a very significant effort has been put into analysing and understanding the causes of fuel 
failures, and important strategies in design, engineering, manufacture, inspection, operation and management 
have been developed to try to avoid them. The results of this effort are reflected in improvements regarding the 
use of new materials, a more robust design, new fabrication methods, more efficient inspections of newly built 
fuel assemblies, quality assurance and better operational strategies. More demanding operational conditions for 
the fuel, or singular interventions like system decontamination or fuel cleaning, have raised concerns about fuel 
performance. The result of these counteracting trends is that fuel performance has improved significantly over 
the years, but there are still some issues which need to be addressed, such as fretting, corrosion, fuel handling, 
and in storage events. 
 
Based on 169 fuel related events reported in nuclear power plants worldwide, and on the work performed under 
the EU Clearinghouse on Nuclear Power Plant Operational Experience Feedback, this summary report lists the 
main causes of actual and potential nuclear fuel failures in three situations: in-core, during handling, and during 
storage. The report also includes the main recommendations to fuel designers and manufacturers, nuclear 
power plant operators and regulatory authorities to reduce the incidence of fuel related events, and a list of 
actions now widely and systematically applied in nuclear power plants that were originated by operational 
experience exchanges and now constitute a set of good actions that help reduce the number of reported fuel 
related events. 
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